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The Changing Face of Illinois Workmen's
Compensation: In Search of a Workable Response to
Federal Guidelines
At the turn of the twentieth century, along with the prosperity
brought by the Industrial Revolution came the toll of industrial
accidents. In almost every state, the injured worker's only recourse
following an accident was through the courts.' Even then, his
chances of recovery were slight because of the common law defenses
available to the employer.2 These defenses-contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow-servant rule-later proved
to be legal fictions inapplicable to modern employment conditions. '
However, prior to workmen's compensation legislation, less than
fifteen percent of the injured employees recovered damages through
common law tort liability.4
Because of his disability and inability to obtain a judgment from
the courts, the individual was unable to sustain himself and those
dependent upon him. By immunizing the employer from tort liability, charitable organizations or state agencies were forced to bear
the burden of these individuals' accidents.5 Recognition of these
inequities aroused sufficient public sentiment and eventually led to
legislative reform. The result was a movement in the states to enact
various forms of workmen's compensation legislation.' The purpose
of this legislation was to supplant the common law rules of masterservant liability by which an employee injured in the course of his
employment bore a disproportionate share of the cost of the accident.7
Workmen's compensation legislation sought to provide adequate
benefits to the injured workmen while strictly limiting employer
liability under the act.' The compensation acts represented a compromise by which injured employees and potentially negligent employers each surrendered certain common law rights.' The employer
1. Eason, Workmen's Compensation-1974 What The Future Holds, 10 FORUM 145, 14647 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Eason]; NATIONAL COMMISSION OF STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

(1972) [hereinafter cited as THE REPORT].
Eason, supra note 1, at 145-46; THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 34.
New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917).
Eason, supra note 1, at 145-47.
New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917).
THE REPORT, supra note 1.
Villapiano v. Better Brands of Illinois, 26 Ill. App. 3d 512, 325 N.E.2d 722 (1975).
New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201-02 (1917).
Note, Workmen's Compensation: The Need for Reform, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 563
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relinguished the immunity he would otherwise be entitled to in
cases where he was not at fault; the employee surrendered his common law right to full damages and accepted a more modest, but
certain recovery.' 0 Compensation under the acts was based solely on
the loss of earning power in relation to the average weekly wage of
the injured employees and the character and duration of the disability." Thus, the cost of work-related injuries was to be allocated to
the employer and accepted as a cost of doing business.' 2 This scheme
offered the most equitable balance for the competing demands of
management and employees. Much has occurred since these early
efforts and this article will attempt to analyze the legislative reactions and practical effects in Illinois.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The workmen's compensation movement originated with the
adoption of the German Compensation Act of 1884.'1 Great Britain
followed in 1897, adopting a workmen's compensation act that
placed the responsibility for compensation exclusively on the shoulders of the employers. 4 By 1908, most of continental Europe had
enacted similar legislation.'"
After the turn of the century, Maryland and Montana also
adopted the compensation principle. However, these state courts
declared the statutes unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds.'" In 1910, New York developed a compensation act that
provided compulsory coverage to employees in certain hazardous
jobs. Employers had the option to elect the same coverage for all
other occupations. The question of this statute's constitutional validity reached the Supreme Court in New York CentralRailroad Co.
v. White.'7 After examining the rationale behind the enactment of
[hereinafter cited as Workmen's Compensation: The Need for Reform].
10. New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 202 (1917).
11. Id.at 204.
12. O'Brien v. Rautenbush, 10 111.2d 167, 139 N.E.2d 222 (1956); Mier v. Staley, 28 Ill.
App. 3d 373, 329 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
13. W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
35 (1974).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119 P. 554 (1911). The
equal protection challenge in Cunningham was raised because employers under the jurisdiction of the workmen's compensation acts were subject to both common law and statutory
liability, whereas all other employers were only subject to common law liability. The Maryland statute was held unconstitutional by a lower court and no appeal was taken, see W.
MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LrrLE, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (1974).
17. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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the workmen's compensation statute, the Court concluded that it
was a permissible use of the state's police power to require an employer to contribute a reasonable amount to compensate the injured
employee for loss of earning power." Relying on the Supreme
Court's ruling, every state enacted workmen's compensation legislation by 1949."1
Under early workmen's compensation statutes, loss of wages arising out of an occupational disease were not covered.2 The goal of
these new programs was limited to providing an effective remedy for
disabilities resulting from industrial accidents. 2 ' Later, it became
obvious that the exclusion of occupational diseases left many disabled workers without assistance under circumstances economically
identical to fellow workers disabled by accidents. As a result,
occupational disease laws designed to correct this omission in the
workmen's compensation laws were passed.2" Almost all the states
amended their law or passed new ones to provide compensation for
losses caused by occupational diseases.23
Illinois enacted its first workmen's compensation statute in
1911.24 In 1917, the state legislature amended the act to make it
compulsory in its application to "extra hazardous" employment.2"
Unlike other state statutes, the Illinois workmen's compensation
acts 21 have never combined the coverage of occupational diseases
18. Id. at 204, 205.
19. Workmen's Compensation: The Need for Reform, supra note 9, at 564.
20. W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
238 (1974).
21. See International Harvester v. Indus. Comm'n, 56 Ill. 2d 84, 93, 305 N.E.2d 529, 534
(1975). The court noted that:
[Slince benefits under workmen's compensation laws were for the most part restricted to accidental injuries . . . many injustices arose where there was no accident and, instead, injury, disease or death were occasioned by slow, gradual, and
insidious processes arising out of and in the course of employment. Occupational
disease laws were designed to correct these injustices and to stand side by side with
workmen's compensation laws . . . to place upon an employer the responsibility for
disease and injury directly attributable to the employment.
22. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Ill. 2d 268, 272, 211 N.E.2d 276, 278
(1965).
23. W. MALONE, H. PLANT & J. LITTLE, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
238 (1974).
24. Act of June, 1910, Ch. 48 §§ 126-52 (1911) Ill. Law 315 (repealed 1913).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.3 (1975) provides:
The provisions of this Act hereinafter following shall apply automatically and without election to the State, county, city, town, township, incorporated village or
school district, body politic or municipal corporation, and to all employers and all
their employees, engaged in any department of the following undertakings, enterprises or businesses which are declared to be extrahazardous . . ..
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138 et seq. (1975), as amended, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138
et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1976 Supp.) and Pub. Act No. 79-1450 (Oct. 1, 1976).
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and accidental injuries.Y Instead, Illinois passed a separate Workmen's Occupational Disease Act in 1951.28 The provisions of this Act
were similar to the Workmen's Compensation Act for both benefits
and procedure. 9 In 1957, the legislature amended the Workmen's
Occupational Disease Act 30 to provide automatic coverage to all
employees in hazardous employment as defined by the Workmen's
Compensation Act. 3
Following the enactment of this social legislation, the compensation benefits failed to keep pace with rising wage levels.3 2 Increased
concern over work-related injuries and disease spurred federal legislation and investigation in this area which had formerly been reserved to the states. Despite the great inroads made by the states,
many critics claimed that the movement now needed additional
impetus to maintain its original objectives.
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION

In the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Congress
established the National Commission of State Workmen's Compensation Law's to "undertake a comprehensive study and evaluation
of State workmen's compensation laws in order to determine if such
laws provide an adequate, prompt, and equitable system of compen27. Workmen's Compensation: The Need for Reform, supra note 9, at 563.
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.36 et seq. (1951).
29. As various commentators have pointed out, there is no real reason for not combining
the two statutes into one, but as of yet, the legislature has refused to do so. See Ropiequet &
Keefe, Coverage of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 169 and
Workmen's Compensation: The Need for Reform, supra note 9, at 563.
30. The Workmen's Occupational Disease Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 172.36 et seq.
(1975).
31. For an analysis of the Illinois workmen's compensation law as it progressed from its
early years, see Angerstein, The Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act after 43 years, 37
Chi. B. Rec. 7 (1955) and Symposium, Workmen's Compensationin Illinois, 1957 U. ILL. L.F.
169-333.
32. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
33. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (1970)
[hereinafter cited as OSHA]. In § 676(a)(1) of OSHA, Congress declared that:
(A) The vast majority of American workers, and their families, are dependent on
workmen's compensation for their basic economic security in the event such workers suffer disabling injury or death in the course of their employment; and that the
full protection of American workers from job-related injury or death requires an
adequate, prompt, and equitable system of workmen's compensation as well as an
effective program of occupational health and safety regulation. ...
(B) in recent years serious questions have been raised concerning the fairness and
adequacy of present workmen's compensation laws in the light of the growth of the
economy, the changing nature of the labor force, increases in medical knowledge,
changes in the hazards associated with various types of employment, new technology creating new risks to health and safety, and increases in the general level of
wages and the cost of living.
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sation. "' 4 The Act required that a final report be transmitted to the
President and to Congress no later than July 31, 1972.1 '
Following extensive investigation, the Commission :" concluded
that workmen's compensation statutes failed to achieve their original objectives. Although states had increased benefits, they had
failed to keep pace with rising wage levels. 7 The commission found
that, in general, the protection furnished to American workers
under workmen's compensation programs was "inadequate and
' '3
inequitable.
In an effort to re-establish the goals of the original legislation in
the present employment scheme, the following objectives for a mod3
ern compensation program were proposed: 1
(1) broad coverage of employees with work-related injuries or diseases;4
(2) substantial protection against interruption of income;"
(3) provision for sufficient medical care and rehabilitative services;' 2
(4) encouragement of safety;4 3 and
(5) prompt delivery of benefits and services."
The National Commission further generated eighty-four recommendations" to serve as guidelines for states in their attempts to
meet the above objectives. Of those eighty-four recommendations,
34. 29 U.S.C. § 676(d)(1) (1970).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 676(d)(2) (1970) provides:
The Workmen's Compensation Commission shall transmit to the President and to
the Congress not later than July 31, 1972, a final report containing a detailed
statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission, together with such
recommendations as it deems advisable.
36. The Commission was composed of 18 members of state workmen's compensation
agencies, business, labor, insurance carriers, the medical profession, educators and the general public. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
37. Id. at 35.
38. Id. at 119.
39. Id. at 15.
40. Protection should be extended to as many workers as is feasible; all work-related
injuries should be covered. Id. at 15.
41. A high proportion of a disabled worker's lost income should be replaced by workmen's
compensation benefits. Id.
42. The injured worker's physical condition and earning capacity should be promptly
restored. Id.
43. Economic incentives in the program should reduce the number of work-related injuries and diseases. Id.
44. The basic objectives should be comprehensively and effectively met. Id. See ILLINOIS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITrEE, REPORT: ILLINOIS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SUB-

COMMiFTEE (1976) (a comprehensive discussion of the delivery system in Illinois); White, The
Illinois Industrial Commission, 53 CHI. B. REC. 427 (1972) [hereinafter cited as White].
45. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.
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nineteen were considered essential to provide an adequate level of
protection for American workers.
Submission of these guidelines to Congress presented the possibility of federal intrusion in this area, but the Commission did not
recommend abandoning the state systems in favor of complete federal control. 7 Instead it advocated reform of the workmen's compensation programs by the states. However, it recommended that this
voluntary state compliance with the essential recommendations be
evaluated on July 1, 1975 and, if necessary, Congress should then
demand compliance."
Since the Occupational Safety and Health Act" had failed to
provide the mechanism by which the evaluation should be made, an
ad hoc committee was formed in 1975.5" The committee's purpose
was to evaluate the state's compliance with the essential recommendations. The committee was composed of representatives from
labor, management, the insurance industry, state workmen's compensation administrators, and federal officials. A substantial compliance subcommittee was created in order to evaluate state programs that failed to fully comply with an essential recommendation,
but were not guilty of a serious deficiency. This subcommittee's
report showed that the average state substantially complied with
thirteen of the nineteen essential recommendations on both July 1,
1975 and January 1, 1976.51 A separate full compliance subcommittee reported that as of July 1, 1975, the average state had complied
with eleven of the nineteen essential recommendations. The average
compliance was also eleven in the follow up study of January 1,

1976 .52
46. Id.
47. Id. at 126. The National Commission stated: "We reject the suggestion that Federal
administration be substituted for state programs at this time."
48. Id. at 127. The National Commission recommended that "compliance of the States
with these essential recommendations should be evaluated on July 1, 1975, and, if necessary,
Congress with no further delay in the effective date should guarantee compliance." Three
dissenters believed congressional action was warranted in 1972. See Supplemental Statements by Horowitz, O'Brien and Peevey, THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 133-34.
49. Congress had provided for the National Commission's automatic termination in the
OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 676 (j) (1970) which provides that "on the ninetieth day after the date of
submission of its final report to the President, the Workmen's Compensation Commission
shall cease to exist."
50. Burton, Workers' Compensation Reform, 27 LABOR L.J. 399, 400 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Burton]. Mr. Burton served as the chairman of the National Commission.
51. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE SUBCOMMIEE, SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE OF STATE LAWS WITH
WORKER'S COMPENSATION RECOMMENDED STANDARDS (1976). This committee's evaluation

showed a state range of compliance from 51/2 to 181/2.
52. FULL COMPLIANCE SUBCOMMITTEE, FULL COMPLIANCE OF STATE LAWS WITH WORKER'S
COMPENSATION RECOMMENDED STANDARDS (1976). The committee's evaluation showed state

compliance ranged from 4 i to 15l/2.
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Whether this data reflects adequate state response to the National Commission's recommendations is subject to various interpretations. Most commentators maintain the impressive response
removes any need to impose mandatory federal standards." Others
assert that the states' response was inadequate, thus warranting the
establishment of federal workmen's compensation programs."
FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS

Senators Williams and Javits introduced legislation in the 93rd
Congress which would have established a number of mandatory
federal standards for state workmen's compensation programs. The
bilI 5 was strongly criticized because its list of federal standards far
exceeded the essential recommendations developed by the National
Commission. Further criticism was directed at the questionable
authority of the Secretary of Labor to promulgate new federal standards without congressional approval and the bill's enforcement
mechanism which relied on federal preemption of the state programs.5" This bill never reached the floor of the Senate.
Similar legislation was introduced in the 94th Congress. Hearings
began in early 1976 on the Senate bill 7 and similar companion
legislation in the House." Many witnesses testifying at these hearings argued that legislation establishing minimum federal standards was warranted because of the states' insufficient response to
the National Commission's recommendations.59 However, they did
not view these bills as the appropriate legislation. 0 Again, the bills'
53. See Hadley, How Much is Enough, 11 FORUM 677 (1976); Eason, supra note 1; Whittaker, National Commission Report on State Workmen's Compensation Law and The Javitts
Bill, 40 INs. COUNSEL J. 283 (1973); Lavorci, A Summary of the Report of the National
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, 1972 INs. L.J. 573. See also J. Burton,
Workers' Compensation Reform and the American Bar Association (1976) (unpublished article) (the author cited the ABA resolution of February 5, 1976 which reaffirmed its position
that workmen's compensation should be the responsibility of the states and opposed federal
legislation in this area).
54. Burton, supra note 50, at 401.
55. S. 2008, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 328 (1973). The bill provided that unless the state's
workmen's compensation law met minimum standards in the Act, the provisions of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Acts would be applied within the state.
56. Burton, supra note 50, at 403.
57. S. 2018, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 253 (1975) established an extensive list of minimum
standards for state workmen's compensation programs. The bill required each state to adopt
the standards as state law and provided for federal court review of state cases to insure
compliance with federal standards.
58. H.R. 9431, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 840 (1975).
59. National Worker's Compensation Act: Hearings on H.R. 9431 Before the Subcommittee on Manpower, Compensation, and Health and Safety of The House Committee on
Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976) (statement of John H. Lewis and John F.
Burton, Jr.).
60. Id.
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most serious deficiencies were the number of federal standards
which transcended the essential recommendations of the National
Commission. Those testifying also criticized the bills' enforcement
mechanism which could open the federal courts to appeal from state
court decisions. 6' Although the hearing may have evidenced the
need for federal action, the general consensus was that the current
bills were unworkable. 2 It is possible that federal legislation may be
re-enacted if it contains more realistic standards and less intrusive
enforcement mechanisms.
ILLINOIS' CHANGING COMPENSATION SCHEMES

Before 1975, Illinois' workmen's compensation and occupational
disease laws were strikingly inadequate based upon the National
Commission's recommendations. When the National Commission's
report was submitted to Congress, Illinois only met five of the
nineteen essential recommendations. 4 The Workmen's Compensation Act in effect at the time was essentially identical to the one
adopted in 1917.65 As a result the benefits provided by the Act failed
to keep pace with employees' wages.6" Although the need for reform
had long been recognized, 7 the threat of federally imposed mandates finally provided impetus for change.
Traditionally, a procedure known as the "agreed bill" process had
been used in Illinois for amending the Workmen's Compensation
Act." In this process representatives of employers and organized
labor would first reach an agreement on the proposed amendments
to the Act. Their compromise would then be introduced into the
Illinois legislature. Fully aware of the consensus reached by labor
and management, the General Assembly would approve the amend61. !d. Both bills provide for adjudication of disputed compensation cases in federal district courts when the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. They also authorize the secretary of labor to enforce the provisions of the Act in federal district court.
62. Interview with John F. Burton, former Chairman of the National Committee on State
Workmen's Compensation Laws, in Chicago (Oct. 10, 1976). Mr. Burton noted that one of
the most important factors in the drive for federal standards is the current political party
complexion within Congress.
63. J. Burton, Workers' Compensation Reform and The American Bar Association (1976)
(unpublished article).
64. Only South Carolina, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kansas and Louisiana ranked below Illinois. Eason, supra note 1, at 158.
65. Workmen s Compensation: The Need for Reform, supra note 9, at 566.
66. Illinois State AFL-CIO Newsletter, May 15, 1976, at 1 [hereinafter cited as AFL-CIO
Newsletter].
67. Workmen's Compensation: The Need for Reform, supra note 9, at 566.
68. Interview with Ronald Nelson, Counsel for Illinois Manufacturing Association, in
Chicago (Sept. 28, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Nelson Interview].
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ments in most instances."
During Governor Daniel Walker's administration the "agreed
bill" process was not used.70 Both labor and business agreed that
changes were in order in light of the Commission's recommendations. However, their interpretation of what was necessary to comply with the Commission's recommendations differed. Illinois employers, through the Illinois Manufacturing Association, introduced
legislation in 1973 and 1975 that substantially complied with the
National Commission's nineteen criteria.7 ' Both bills were defeated.
In 1975, labor proposed amendments to the Illinois Occupational
Disease Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act. 72 These two
amendments went substantially beyond the changes proposed by
the employers. Since the General Assembly was heavily dominated
by supporters of organized labor, both bills passed without amendment to be effective July 1, 1975.11 This legislation represented almost a complete revision of the prior workmen's compensation and
occupational disease acts.74
Because of the drastic effects of the 1975 amendments, employer
groups sought modification. The legislature responded in 19767' by
deleting or modifying the provisions which had come under the
strongest attack. 76 However, employer groups maintain that even
though the 1976 amendments alleviated some of the problems generated by the 1975 Act, they still imposed an excessive burden on
management.7 7
INCREASED BENEFIT PROVISIONS

Perhaps the most controversial 1975 amendments"5 were those
69. Id.
70. Nelson Interview, supra note 68; Illinois Manufacturing Association Bulletin: Review
of Workmen's Compensation Problems in Illinois, August, 1976, at 1. [hereinafter cited as
IMA Bulletin].
71. Illinois S.B. 567 and S.B. 848 met in substance 17 out of the 19 essential recommendations. Nelson Interview, supra note 68.
72. S.B. 234 and S.B. 235 (1975).
73. Pub. Act No. 79-79 (July 1, 1975).
74. Interview with Stanley Johnson, Chairman of the AFL-CIO, in Chicago (Oct. 11,
1976). Mr. Johnson stated, "our position is we fought for the changes for 40 years and won."
75. Pub. Act No. 79-1450 (Oct. 1, 1976).
76. See text accompanying notes 108-10, 115-16, 165-66 infra.
77. IMA Bulletin, supra note 70, at 3.
78. Many other changes occurred in the 1975 and 1976 amendments which will not be
discussed in this article. The more important changes included a provision broadening the
definition of a "hazardous undertaking" to make coverage inclusive as to virtually all employers; penalty provisions for the employer's delay in giving the benefits; changes in the employee's notification requirement to the employer; a provision allowing the employee to
choose a doctor of his own choice at the employer's expense, extra-territorial application; and
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that increased the benefit rates for temporary total and permanent
total disabilities and for payments made to the spouses and children
of fatally injured employees. Prior to the 1975 Act, compensation
rates for temporary total disability were based on 65 percent of the
employee's average weekly wage. 9 However, these rates had to fall
within statutorily prescribed limits. The minimum rates started at
$31.50 and progressed to $49.00 based on the employee's marital
status and number of children.80 The maximum rates started at
$100.90 and progressed to $124.30 again based on the individual's
family status."' Because of these prescribed ceilings, middle and
upper level wage earners were forced to accept an amount much
lower than sixty-five percent of their salary."'
The 1975 amendments base initial temporary disability compensation on two-thirds of the employee's average weekly wage. 3 The
minimum computation ranges from $100.90 to $124.30 depending
upon the employee's number of dependents (the maximum rates
formerly prescribed under the prior Act). However, the employee's
benefit could never exceed his average weekly wage,"' i.e., if twothirds of the employee's wages is less than the statutory minimum,
he may only receive the statutory minimum or 100 percent of his
average weekly wage, whichever is less.
The maximum rate for all accidents under the 1975 Act (including
compensation for permanent disability and death benefits) is 100
percent of the state's average weekly wage based on the state's
manufacturing industry. 5 The Act also provides for progressive increases in the maximum weekly compensation. By 1981, the maximum rate will be 200 percent of the state's average weekly wage.
incorporation of much of the Workmen's Compensation Act by reference into the Workmen's
Occupational Disease Act. These amendments along with the changes to be discussed represent a substantial revision of the Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease Acts.
79. The Workmen's Compensation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8 (1973).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.8(b) 2(B)(3) (1973).
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.8(b) 2 (B)(4) (1973).
82. AFL-CIO Newsletter, supra note 66, at 1.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.8 (b)(1) (1975).
84. Id.
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.8 (b)(4) (1975); § 138.8 (b)(6), provides:
The Department of Labor of the State shall on or before the 15th day of May, 1976,
and on or before the 15th day of May, annually thereafter, publish the State's
average weekly wage in manufacturing industries and the Industrial Commission
shall on the 15th day of July, 1976 and on the 15th day of each July . . .publish
the State's average wage . . . ; the amount . . . shall be conclusive and shall be
applicable as the basis of computation of compensation rates . . ..
The current state average weekly wage in manufacturing is $231.42. Interview with Gretchen
Wolfe Benett, Industrial Commission Counselor, in Chicago (Sept. 22, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Benett Interviewl.
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This provision will prove beneficial only to those high-paid workers
whose weekly earnings greatly exceed the state's average weekly
wage since the initial two-thirds computation is still applicable.,,
Compensation rates for permanent total disability were altered
drastically in 1975. Under the prior Act, a claimant was entitled to
receive sixty-five percent of his earnings, but again was limited by
minimum and maximum figures of $31.50 and $59.00 respectively.
This compensation would continue until the total amount the employee received equaled the amount which would have been payable
as a lump sum death benefit. 7 Thereafter, the employee would receive an annual pension for the duration of his life in an amount
equal to twelve or fifteen percent of the amount that would have
been payable as a lump sum death benefit. The practical effect of
this pension provision was to dramatically reduce employees' annual compensation. The most any claimant would receive was
fifteen percent of $34,485, (the maximum death benefit allowed)
approximately $5,100 per year. 9
The 1975 amendments treat permanent total disability and
temporary. total disability almost identically for computing compensation benefits. The compensation for permanent total disability is to be based on two-thirds of the employee's average wage.!'"
The minimum rates are slightly lower than the applicable rates for
temporary total disability, since they start at $80.90 and increase
up to $96.90. 91 Again in no event may the employee receive more
than his average weekly wage. Unlike the prior Act, these benefits
are to be paid for the duration of the employee's disability without
limitations as to dollar amount or time. The maximum rates are
identical to those under temporary total disability, i.e., 100 percent
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.8(b)(4) (1975). These changes were in compliance with
the National Commission's recommendations. The Commission stated:
We recommend that cash benefits for temporary total disability be at least twothirds of the worker's gross weekly wage. We recommend progressive increases in
the maximum weekly wage benefit, according to a time schedule . . . so that by
1981 the maximum in each State would be at least 200 percent of the State's
average weekly wage.
THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 19. It has been suggested that tying the maximum compensation
to the state's average weekly wage will alleviate the need for frequent amendments to the
Act's rate schedules. See ILL. INST. CONT. LEG. EDUC., WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PRACT. § 826 (1975).
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.8(f) (1973).
88. Benett Interview, supra note 85.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.7(a)(3) (1973). This maximum amount would be available
.only if there were four eligible children still at home.
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.8(b)(1) (1975).
91. Id.
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of the state's average weekly manufacturing wage."
As of July 1, 1975, the benefits to spouses and children of fatally
injured employees were substantially increased. For accidents occuring prior to July 1, 1975, the basic benefit was theoretically set
at 9.25 times the employee's average annual earnings.9" However,
these benefits were subject to minimum and maximum rates. The
minimum rates started at $10,250 and increased up to $12,830 depending on the number of eligible children under age eighteen." The
maximum rates started at $24,624 and progressed up to $34,485.11
The minimum statutory benefits were rarely employed. 6 Unless the
employee's average earnings were well below the poverty level, the
maximum benefits always applied. Once this amount was paid, the
beneficiaries received no further benefits, regardless of their need.97
The 1975 amendments provided that death benefits were to be
computed on the same basis as permanent total disability. The
basic benefit is two-thirds of the employee's average weekly wage.99
The minimum benefit is the lesser of either the employee's average
weekly wage or the minimum rates applicable under permanent
total disability.9
All death benefits are payable to the surviving spouse for the
benefit of the spouse and the employee's children. Benefits for the
children continue until the child reaches eighteen, or up to twentyfive if the child is enrolled in an accredited educational institution.'09 The benefits are to be paid for the life of the spouse, or until
the spouse remarries. Upon remarriage, the spouse will receive a
lump sum payment representing two years of compensation, extinquishing all further rights.'"'
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.8(b)(4) (1975). These changes were in compliance with
the National Commission's recommendations. The Commission stated:
We recommend that permanent total benefits be paid for the duration of the
worker's disability without limitations as to dollar amount or time. We recommend
that subject to the State's maximum weekly benefit, permanent total disabilities
be at least 66 2/3 percent of the worker's gross weekly wage.
THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 §
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 §
Benett Interview, supra
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 §

98.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.7(a) (1975).

138.7(a) (1973).
138.7(a)(3) (1973).
note 85; Nelson Interview, supra note 68.
138.7 (a) (1973).

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The death benefit changes were in compliance with the National Commission's
recommendations. The Commission stated:
We recommend that as of July 1, 1973, the maximum weekly death benefit be at
least sixty-six 2/3 percent of the State's average weekly wage, and that as of July
1, 1975, the maximum be at least 100 percent of the State's average weekly wage.
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The most controversial section of the 1975 amendments provided
that compensation rates for temporary total, permanent total and
death benefits never should be less than fifty percent of the state's
average weekly wage. 02 This provision has the effect of raising the
maximum limits for employees whose wages are twice the state
average weekly wage. The result was a potentially prohibitive future
1 For example,
cost to employers. 03
the death of a highly paid married
executive, earning $82,000 a year, with several children might require an employer to reserve an amount approaching one million
dollars to provide the spouse half the employee's weekly salary for
life. 10 4
In reality, the percentage of death cases to the total amount of
claims filed is very small. 05 Additionally, highly paid executives
rarely die leaving young spouses and many eligible dependent children. 06 However, during lobbying efforts, employers used this provision as an attention-getter to demonstrate the extensive liability
possible under the amended Act. 107 In response, the legislature in
1976 eliminated the provision which allowed fifty percent of the
employee's average weekly wage as a minimum rate. 018 The applicable amendments now provide that the maximum amount payable
is 100 percent of the state's average weekly manufacturing wage.
The minimum rate now prescribed is not less than fifty percent of
the state average weekly wage in manufacturing' 9 thus, deleting the
most criticized provision of the 1975 amended Act."10
These rate changes represent legislative awareness of the plights
of injured employees and their families under the pre-1975 Act. The
protection offered under this Act was in most cases grossly inadeWe recommend that death benefits be paid to a widow or widower for life or until
remarriage, and in the event of remarriage we recommend that two years' benefits
be paid in a lump sum to the widow or widower. We also recommend that benefits
for a dependent child be continued at least until the child reaches 18, or beyond
such age if actually dependent, or at least until age 25 if enrolled as a full-time
student in any accredited educational institution.
THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 71-72.
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.8(b)(4) (1975).
103. Nelson Interview, supra note 68; Benett Interview, supra note 85; Interview with
Mark Braun, Instructor in Law at Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, in Chicago
(Sept. 27, 1976) [hereinafter cited as the Braun Interview].
104. See Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 1976, at 13, col. 1; IMA Bulletin, supra note 70, at 2.
105. Benett Interview, supra note 85. Ms. Benett estimated that out of 50,000 claims filed,
only 150 are death cases.
106. Id.
107. Nelson Interview, supra note 68.
108. Pub. Act No. 79-1450 (Oct. 1, 1976).
109. Id.
110. All individuals interviewed agreed that this particular provision was "ridiculous."
Benett Interview, supra note 85; Nelson Interview, supra note 65; Braun Interview, supra note
103.
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quate, leaving the employee to bear a disproportionately heavy burden from an industrial accident. Now, under the 1975 and 1976
amendments, the equities have been more evenly balanced to insure
that management will share in the costs of occupational injuries.",
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Other amendments effective July 1, 1975 increased the period in
which compensation claims could be filed. The prior statute of limitations had limited the time to file the claim to within one year after
the date of the accident, or the last payment of compensation in
injury cases. For death cases, the applicable limitation period was
within one year from the date of death or the last payment of compensation. Additionally, there was a requirement that the death
must have occurred within two years of the work-related accident."'
The 1975 amendments lengthened the applicable limitation period by providing that claims must be filed within three years of the
date of accident or last payment of compensation in injury cases,
or within three years from the date of death or last payment of
compensation in death cases."' Identical provisions were incorporated in the Workmen's Occupational Disease Act."' The requirement that death must occur within two years of the date of accident
was deleted. In 1976, the legislature modified the 1975 provisions.
111. Another new feature introduced by the 1975 amendments was the provision for
automatic adjustment of certain benefits to reflect increases in the state's average weekly
wage in manufacturing industries. The provision applies to awards in death and permanent
total disability cases. On July 15 of the second year following the date of the entry of the
award and on July 15 of each year thereafter, the award is subject to adjustment. During the
intervening period, if there has been an increase in the state average weekly wage in manufacturing industries, the weekly compensation rate is proportionately increased by the same
percentage as the percentage of the manufacturing wage increase. The increase is paid by the
State Treasurer from a special fund, the Compensation Rate Adjustment Fund. The account
is funded from payments by all employers of one-half of one percent of all compensation
payments made subsequent to July 1, 1975. However if there is a decrease in the state average
weekly wage, the then existing compensation rate is not adjusted.
The rationale behind this provision was probably the protection against inflation erosion
of benefits. Although it has been criticized by employment groups as placing a future financial burden on employers regardless of their efforts to eliminate work-related accidents, it has
not been deleted by the 1976 legislation.
112. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.6 (3) (1973).
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.6 (c)(2) (1975). This change was in compliance with the
National Commission's recommendation. The Commission stated:
We recommend that the time limit for initiating a claim be three years after the
date the claimant knows, or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have known,
of the existence of the impairment and its possible relationship to his employment. . . .If benefits have previously been provided, the claim period should begin
on the date benefits were last furnished.
THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
114. The Workmen's Occupational Disease Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 172.41 (c) (1975).
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Application for death benefits now must be filed within three years
after the date of death, or within two years after the date of the last
payment of compensation, whichever is later."' The actual cost
effect of this change in the provision is questionable,"' since in
every case a minimum of three years from the date of accident is
applicable.
What has raised questions under the new Act is how the lengthened statute of limitation should be applied. The Illinois Industrial
Commission has taken the position that the limitations provisions
are procedural and, therefore, should be applied retroactively." 7
Accordingly, all cases which were dismissed in the recent past for
exceeding the statute of limitations could be refiled as long as the
date of accident was no more than three years prior to the new date
of filing."' In contrast, other individuals involved in workmen's
compensation litigation maintain that the right to raise the statute
of limitations as an affirmative defense is a vested right and cannot
be taken away by legislation." 9
Although the courts are not in complete agreement, the wellsettled rule of statutory construction is that a statute will not be
given a retroactive effect, unless such an intention of the legislature
is clearly shown.2 0 Despite this general rule, an exception may be
made for statutory changes considered procedural and relating to a
remedy as opposed to a right.' 2' In the workmen's compensation
115. Pub. Act No. 79-1450 (Oct. 1, 1976).
116. Benett interview, supra note 85.
117. Illinois Industrial Commission Memorandum to Commissioners and Arbitrators,
Melvin L. Rosenbloom, July 8, 1975.
118. Id. The Chairman of the Illinois Industrial Commission directed the arbitrators and
commissioners that:
The Statute of Limitations is effective now and applies to all cases regardless of
the date of injury. In other words, any case heard on or after July 1, 1975 would be
actionable unless the date of accident was more than three years prior to the filing
date. This also means that cases which have been dismissed in the recent past
because they were beyond the period of the Statute of Limitation may be refiled
as long as the date of the accident is no more than three years prior to the new date
of filing.
119. Memorandum of Wiedner and McAuliffe, Statute of Limitations, July 1, 1975
Amendments (Fall, 1975) (the amended limitations period should be given only prospective
application); Braun Interview, supra note 103.
120. See In re Estate of Krotzsch, 60 II. 2d 342, 345, 326 N.E.2d 758, 760 (1975); Miner
v. Stafford, 326 Ill. 204, 207, 157 N.E. 164, 165 (1927); Mather v. Parkhurst, 302 Ill. 236, 238,
134 N.E. 91, 92 (1922); People v. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 Il1. 132, 137, 94 N.E. 162, 164
(1911); Tyrrell v. Municipal Employees Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, 32 Ill. App.
3d 91, 99, 336 N.E.2d 97, 104 (1975).
121. Hogan v. Bleeker, 29 Ill. 2d 181, 187, 188, 193 N.E.2d 844, 847 (1963); Mt. Morris
Savings and Loan Association v. Barber, 17 Il1. 2d 523, 524, 162 N.E.2d 347, 349 (1959);
Orlicki v. McCarthy, 4 Il. 2d 342, 344, 122 N.E.2d 513, 514 (1954); McQueen v. Connor, 385
I1. 455, 460, 53 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1944); Hilberg v. Indus. Comm'n, 380 Ill. 102, 105, 43 N.E.2d
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area, the question has been presented in terms of whether a change
in the limitation period for the filing of claims is a procedural or
substantive change. Generally, the courts have ruled that a change
in a limitation period is procedural and may be applied to existing
causes of action.'2 2 In reaching this decision, some courts characterized the change in the statute of limitations as one relating to the
method of obtaining a remedy and not to the specific right to compensation. 2 3
However, it is equally apparent that procedural or remedial statutes cannot be construed retroactively to deprive persons of vested
property rights.' 4 As the court in Orlicki v. McCarthy'2 " recognized,
the concept of a vested right is "fraught with vagaries that defy
precise definition. ' ' 2 Whether a statute of limitation defense was
such a right vesting in the individual was first determined by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Blodgett.'27 The
court viewed this right of defense to be as valuable as the right to
bring the lawsuit itself.' 8 The court declared:
When the bar of a statute of limitations has become completed by
the running of the full-statutory period, the right to plead the
defense is a vested right which cannot be destroyed by legislation,
since it is protected there by Section two of the bill of rights incorporated in the State constitution which declares that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law."121
Blodgett is cited frequently for the proposition that once a statute
of limitations has run no subsequent legislation may revive it. 30
At issue now is whether the statute of limitations in the Workmen's Compensation Act comprises a vested right that is protected
671, 673 (1942); Diamond T Motor Car Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 378 Ill.
203, 208, 37 N.E.2d
782, 784 (1941).
122. Hilberg v. Indus. Comm'n, 380 Il.102, 106, 43 N.E.2d 671, 672-73 (1942); Diamond
T Motor Car Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 378 Ill. 203, 207, 37 N.E.2d 782, 784-85 (1941). Both
courts ruled that a change in the statute of limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act
was procedural and should be given retroactive application.
123. Hilberg v. Indus. Comm'n, 380 Ill.
102, 106, 43 N.E.2d 671, 672-73 (1942); Diamond
T Motor Car Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 378 Ill.
203, 207, 37 N.E.2d 782, 784-85 (1941).
124. Hogan v. Bleeker, 29 111.2d 181, 187, 193 N.E.2d 844, 848 (1963).
125. 4 Ill.
2d 342, 122 N.E.2d 513 (1954).
126. Id. at 347, 122 N.E.2d at 515.
127. 155 I11.
441, 40 N.E. 1025 (1895).
128. Id. at 450, 40 N.E. at 1027.
129. Id. at 446, 40 N.E. at 1026.
130. See Country Mutual Ins. Co. v. Knight, 40 Ill.
2d 423, 240 N.E.2d 612 (1968); People
v. Lansing, 35 I11.
2d 247, 220 N.E.2d 218 (1966).
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by the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution.' 3' Although the
Illinois Industrial Commission will apply the new statute of limitation retroactively,' the court should inquire into whether the purpose of the statute of limitations is thwarted by this application.
By enacting statutes of limitations, legislatures attempt to serve
three general purposes-providing competent evidence; promoting
due diligence; and insuring personal certainty. 3 By approving a
lengthened statute of limitation, the legislature has, in effect, considered the first two purposes and found them not disserved by an
extension of time. However, the purpose of assuring the potential
defendant that he will not be subject to court-imposed liability after
a specified period of time would be defeated by a retroactive application. Employers would be subject to liability arising from causes
of actions which had expired under the previous statute of limitations. It is questionable whether the legislature intended to impose
this additional burden on management, in view of the substantial
burden resulting from increased compensation benefits.' However,
the legislature could have found the one year limitation period extremely short, terminating claimants rights too quickly.' 35 A retroactive application of the three year limitation would at least alleviate
this inequity for a small group of claimants.' 6
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AMENDMENTS

The 1975 General Assembly also extensively amended the Illinois
Occupational Diseases Act.'37 The amendments incorporated substantial portions of the Workmen's Compensation Act by reference.
131. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law ....
"
132. The Illinois Industrial Commission is responsible for the administration of the Act.
White, supra note 44, at 427-28.
133. Kelley, Statutes of Limitations in the Era of the Compensation Systems: Workmen's
Compensation Limitations Provisions for Accidental Injury Claims, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 541
[hereinafter cited as Kelley].
134. Kelley, supra note 133, at 629. The author conducted a study to determine if varying
limitation provisions relate to the employer's cost. He concluded that cost differentials attributable to varying limitation provisions were probably minimal.
135. See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 24. The National Commission notes that
The problem for an employee meeting the time limit in filing his claim is particularly acute where his impairment results from a work related disease. A substantial
lapse may occur between exposure to the disease producing substance and the
manifestation or diagnosis of the disease.
136. Indeed one commentator has suggested eliminating time limitations entirely. This
action would best achieve the purpose behind workmen's compensation-to shift the economic burden of industrial accidents from the employee to the employer and ultimately to
the consumer. Kelley, supra note 133, at 629.
137. The Workmen's Occupational Disease Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48 § 172.36 et. seq.
(1975).
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The Acts now contain identical provisions as to compensation

rates,1 31 statutes of limitations, 131 and notice provisions,4 0 and are

extra-territorial in their application."
The most dramatic change enacted by the legislature was in the
definition of an occupational disease. The 1975 amendments define
an "occupational disease" as a "disease arising out of and in the
course of employment or which has become aggravated and rendered disabling as a result of an exposure of the employment."''
Further, the 1975 legislation provides compensation to employees
suffering from ordinary diseases of life to which the general public
is also exposed. However, these ordinary diseases must still meet the
requirements of an occupational disease.4 3 These two changes eliminated the restrictions in the Occupational Disease Act which had
generated extensive litigation.'
The pre-1975 Occupational Disease Act provided compensation
for ordinary diseases of life only in very limited circumstances.
Litigation often arose where an employee was seeking compensation
for contracting emphysema,' tuberculosis 4 ' or cancer.'47 These diseases clearly fit into the definition of an "ordinary disease of life
to which the public is exposed to outside the employment."' 48 Often
there was substantial evidence introduced that this ordinary disease
was considerably aggravated by the employment conditions." 9 How138. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 172.42 (1975).
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 172.41 (1975), as amended, Pub. Act No. 79-1450 (1976).
140. Id.
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 172.36 (b)(2) (1975).
142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 172.36(d) (1975), as amended, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48 §
172.36(d) (Smith-Hurd 1976 Supp.).
143. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48 § 172.36 (1973) provided:
(d) In this Act, the term "Occupational Disease" means a disease arising out and
in the course of employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public
is exposed outside the employment shall not be compensable, except where said
disease follows as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section.
144. See ILL. INST. CoNT. LEG. EDUC., WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PRACTICE §§ 9-2, 9-3
(1975).
145. See Payne v. Indus. Comm'n, 61111. 2d 66, 329 N.E.2d 206 (1975); Int'l Harvester
Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 56 Ill. 2d 84, 305 N.E.2d 529 (1973); Leason v. Indus. Comm'n, 55 Ill.
2d 486, 303 N.E.2d 414 (1973); Rockford Transit Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Ill. 2d 111, 230
N.E.2d 264 (1967); Lewis v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Ill. 2d 461, 231 N.E.2d 593 (1967).
146. Stewart Warner Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 376 Ill. 141, 33 N.E.2d 196 (1941).
147. See Osco Drugs Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 36 Ill. 2d 361, 223 N.E.2d 105 (1967); Jenks
v. Indus. Comm'n, 29 Ill. 2d 440, 194 N.E.2d 301 (1963).
148. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.36 (d) (1975).
149. For example, in Int. Harvester Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 56 Ill.2d 84, 305 N.E.2d 529
(1973), evidence was introduced establishing that the noxious agents involved in welding
substantially aggravated the claimant's emphysema. In Rockford Transit Corp. v. Indus.
Comm'n, 38 111. 2d 111, 230 N.E.2d 264 (1967), evidence indicated that the inhalation of the
fumes caused the aggravation of the emphysema which resulted in the employee becoming
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ever, if the disease did not have its origin in the employment or
5 0 recovery would
follow as an incident of an occupational disease,1
5
be denied. '
To avoid this result and allow recovery to the disabled employee,
some courts would fashion relief instead, under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. One of the earliest cases to employ this approach was Quaker Oats Co. v. IndustrialCommission.' The court
held that an aggravation of a pre-existing disease is an injury compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act if the evidence
shows that the aggravation of the disease was caused by an accidental injury arising in the course of employment. 3 Subsequently,
other courts used this approach to compensate those suffering ordinary diseases of life.154 For instance, a line of heart attack cases
present a good example of a disease being translated into an accident, and therefore compensable, if the court finds the requisite
155
causal element is present.
However, with the exception of the heart attack cases, courts
more often denied than awarded compensation in this type of situation. ' This refusal resulted from the requirement that an injury
must be traceable to a definite time, place and cause to be considdisabled much sooner than he would have otherwise. Finally, in Stewart Warner Corp. v.
Indus. Comm'n, 376 Ill. 141, 33 N.E.2d 196 (1941), substantial evidence clearly showed that
the inhalation of sulphur dioxide fumes had caused lung irritation and a flareup of latent TB.
150. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 172.36(d) (1973). Prior to the 1975 amendments the Act
defined "Occupational Disease" as a disease arising out of and in the course of employment.
Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment
shall not be compensable unless said disease follows as an occupational disease as defined in
this section.
151. See note 149 supra.
152. 414 Ill. 326, 111 N.E.2d 351 (1953).
153. Id.
154. See Leason v. Indus. Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 486, 493, 303 N.E.2d 414, 418-19 (1973)
(claimant was entitled to compensation where an accident had aggravated his pulmonary
emphysema); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Ill. 2d 268, 273, 211 N.E.2d 276,
279 (1965) (the court awarded compensation for dermatitis).
155. See Johns-Mansville Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 60 Ill. 2d 221, 225, 326 N.E.2d 389,
392-93 (1975); Chicago Tribune v. Indus. Comm'n, 42 11. 2d 476, 478, 248 N.E.2d 103, 104
(1969); Republic Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 26 Ill. 2d 32, 43, 185 N.E.2d 877, 884 (1962);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 290, 295-96, 128 N.E.2d 714, 717 (1955);
Tyrrell v. Municipal Employees Annuity Fund, 32 Ill. App. 3d 91, 95-96, 336 N.E.2d 97, 10203 (1975).
156. Cases which denied recovery because the disease was an ordinary disease of life and
not following as an incident of an occupational disease include: Payne v. Indus. Comm'n, 61
Ill. 2d 66, 68, 329 N.E.2d 206, 208 (1975); Int'l Harvester Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 56 I1. 2d 84,
93, 305 N.E.2d 529, 535 (1973); Rockford Transit Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Ill. 2d 104, 11314, 230 N.E.2d 264, 266 (1967); Lewis v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Ill. 2d 461, 466, 231 N.E.2d 593,
595-96 (1967); Stewart Warner Corp. v. Indus, Comm'n, 376 Ill. 141, 145, 33 N.E.2d 196, 199
(1941).
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ered an accident under the Workmen's Compensation Act.'5 7 As
most diseases involved a gradual, insidious process, most claimants
would find it impossible to meet this requirement. For example, in
International Harvester v. Industrial Commission ' the employee
claimed that the inhalation of irritating fumes over a six-year period
constituted an accidental injury. The court found that the employee
had not suffered from an accidental injury within the meaning of
the Act, but rather from a gradual debilitating disease. 5" It rejected
his contention that the precise time and place requirement was no
longer applicable.'"0 It concluded that neither Act provides compensation for a disability arising from the aggravation of pre-existing,
ordinary diseases of life. The court noted that if "we were to adopt
the fiction urged in this case, the distinction between the two acts
would be obliterated and a claim for practically any disease, occupational or pre-existing, could be brought under the Workmen's
Compensation Act." 6 '
In recent cases, the Illinois Supreme Court has invited the legislature to provide compensation under these circumstances." 2 The
legislature accepted this invitation and removed the restrictive language from the Workmen's Occupational Disease Act. Under the
1975 amendments it was no longer necessary to establish that the
disease had its causation or inception in the employment.1 3 However, it is still necessary to establish that the disease was "aggravated" by employment conditions.
The ambiguities surrounding the meaning of "aggravation" have
caused difficulty for those involved in workmen's compensation litigation. Numerous individuals have feared that the 1975 amendments would create a flood of litigation and remuneration for
employees' disabilities. 6 '
To lessen the possible impact of this amendment and in response
to media and constituent pressures, the legislature further amended
157. See Johns-Mansville Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 60 Il. 2d 221, 225, 326 N.E.2d 389,
391 (1975); Int'l Harvester Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 56 Ill.
2d 84, 89, 305 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1973);
Fittro v. Indus. Comm'n, 377 Ill.
532, 538, 37 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1941).
158. 56 Ill.
2d 84, 304 N.E.2d 529 (1973).
159. Id. at 90, 305 N.E.2d at 533.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 94, 305 N.E.2d at 535.
162. See Int'l Harvester Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 56 Il1. 2d 84, 93, 304 N.E.2d 529, 535
(1973); Rockford Transit Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Ill. 2d 111, 114, 230 N.E.2d 264, 266
(1967) (the court notes, "If it is desirable that compensation be made under circumstances
such as those in the present case, the legislature can readily make the appropriate amendments.").
163. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 172.36(d) (1975) as amended. Pub. Act No. 79-1450 (1976).
164. See ILL. INST. CONT. LEG. EDUC., WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PRACTICE §§ 9-2, 9-3
(1975).
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the definition of "occupational disease" in 1976. The term now
means "a disease arising out of and in the course of employment or
which has become aggravated and rendering disabling as a result of
the employment. Such aggravation should arise out of a risk peculiar to, or increased by employment and not common to the general
public.' '1 5 This amendment clearly limits the application of aggravation, however, ordinary diseases of life are still compensable.
Therefore, these 1976 changes will probably result in the alleviation of the employee's hardships exemplified in International
Harvester,' but not extending liability to the extent that the employer is liable for all adverse consequences which have some relation to the employment.
COSTS
The National Commission submitted an analysis of what the cost
of adopting its recommendations would be for each state."7 The cost
estimates were calculated on the basis of a compensation program
virtually identical to Illinois' 1975 act.' The estimated cost increases among the states ranged from a high of sixty percent in
Louisiana to 2.4 percent in Arizona." 9 The estimated increase for
Illinois was only seventeen percent,7 0 an increase substantially
lower than most other states. 7 ' The cost of adopting the recommendations was also computed by comparing the proportion of the payroll devoted to workmen's compensation by employers in 1972 to
what they would have to contribute in 1975 to meet the National
Commission's recommendations.' In 1972, Illinois employers' average payroll contribution for workmen's compensation was only .657
percent.' In order to meet the essential recommendations by 1975,
Illinois employer's estimated contribution would increase only to
.771 percent.'
165. Pub. Act No. 79-1450 (Oct. 1, 1976).
166. 56 111.2d 84, 305 N.E.2d 529 (1973).
167. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 73.
168. Id.
169. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 143. In Table B.1 the National Commission estimates
cost increases or decreases, expressed as a percentage of current costs, of incorporating the
recommendations of the National Commission on state workmen's compensation laws into
state laws in effect as of January 1, 1972.
170. Id.
171. Only six states ranked below Illinois. Id.
172. THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 145. In Table B.2 the National Commission estimates
the percentage of payroll devoted to workmen's compensation premiums by employers in a
representative sampling of insurance classifications.
173. Id.
174. Id. The Commission noted that while adoptions of their recommendations would
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These predictions did not present the potentiality of a drastic cost
increase to Illinois employers. And at the present time there is insufficient evidence to determine the real cost increases. However, the
actual experience in Illinois following the 1975 amendments indicates that substantial costs may result from the revision of the acts.
Immediately following the enactment of 1975 amendments, the
Illinois insurance carriers filed for a forty-six percent rate increase.'75
The insurance companies based this increase on a prospective analysis, claiming that because of the change in benefits, they would
have to obtain funds immediately for reserve purposes.'7 6 The Illinois Department of Insurance, which has the statutory responsibility for approving workmen's compensation rates,' routinely approved the forty-six percent increase.'7 8
In November, 1975, the insurance carriers requested another rate
increase of 9.6 percent based on actual loss experience. 7 ' After a
hearing, the Director for the Department of Insurance determined
that only a 3.6 percent increase would be approved.8 0 In April, 1976,
another rate increase of 24.3 percent was requested by insurance
carriers. The request was denied at that time. However, after a
hearing in June, the acting Director of Insurance granted the 24.3
percent increase.' Since the latter two rate increases were compounding the first, the total increase was greater than ninety percent of the pre-1975 rates.
Following this last increase, a group of trade associations and
individual employers, representing a substantial portion of Illinois
employers and the Illinois State Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organization filed a lawsuit against the Department of
Insurance. The plaintiffs charged that the June 16, 1976, rate increase was excessive and illegal and that prior increases were unsupincrease the cost of workmen's compensation in all of the states, workmen's compensation
would remain a small proportion of the wage bill for the average employer. THE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 75.
175. Interview with Richard Seligman, Chief Counsel of the Department of Insurance in
Springfield (Oct. 5, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Seligman Interview]; Nelson Interview, supra
note 68; IMA bulletin, supra note 70, at 2.
176. Nelson Interview, supra note 68.
177. Workmen Compensation and Employer Liability Rates, ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 73
§ 1065.4 (1975) provides: "Every company shall file with the Director ... [and] (3) Director
shall review filing as soon as reasonably possible after they have been made to determine
whether they meet the requirements of this Article."
178. Seligman Interview, supra note 175.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Benett Interview, supra note 85. This last rate was approved by the acting Director
of Insurance. The increase has been attacked on the grounds that the Director has no authority to grant the increase. See note 182 infra.

19771

Workmen's Compensation in Illinois

portable.' 2 In a preliminary hearing, the court determined that the
plaintiffs must first pursue a remedy through the administrative
procedure of the Department of Insurance.'83 Shortly thereafter, the
insurance carriers filed for a rate decrease of one percent based on
cost projections from the October, 1976 amendments.' 4 The Department of Insurance is now holding public hearings on the three previous rate increases and the one percent decrease request.'85
Smaller firms and employers in dangerous occupations suffered
the most from insurance rate changes. In some industries, rates
increased up to 200 percent.' 6 And if a business complained, the
insurance carriers often responded by threatening to discontinue the
business' compensation coverage.' 8 7 Firms with substantial past
losses and smaller companies were dropped by their respective insurance carriers after doing business together for years.'8 8 This action was not necessarily because these firms represented a high risk,
but because of the additional administrative cost for the carriers. It
is the carriers' position that it is often unprofitable to underwrite
these firms.'8 The only alternatives available to these employers are
182. Coordinating Comm. of Mechanical Speciality Contractors Ass'n v. Duncan, 76 L.
12896 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., filed July 14, 1976). The applicable statute, Workmen's Compensation Rates, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73 § 1065.1 (1975), provides: "The purpose of this Article is to
promote the public welfare by regulating Workmen's Compensation and employers liability
insurance rates to the end that shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory."
The employer's group also attacked the rates as void because of the acting Director's lack of
authority to issue them.
183. Coordinating Comm. of Mechanical Speciality Contractors Ass'n v. Duncan, 76 L
12896 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. filed July 14, 1976).
184. Seligman Interview, supra note 175.
185. The State Insurance Director, Michael P. Duncan, appointed Professor Spencer
Kimball as the independent hearing officer to hold public hearings on workmen's compensation insurance rates. The hearings commenced on September 22, 1976. Only a procedural
issue has been disposed of as of this date. Kimball has granted petitioners limited discovery
of the insurance companies' books. Seligman Interview, supra note 175; Illinois Department
of Insurance Newsletter, September 1, 1976.
186. Nelson Interview, supra note 68. Nelson commented that the 90 percent increase
represents an average of the state wide increases. High risk operations such as construction
experienced substantial increases in rates (up to 200 percent), while in other occupations
(clerical) rates may have dropped.
187. Interview with Barbara Crane, Insurance Administrator, GATX Corporation, in Chicago (Oct. 1, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Crane Interview.]; Nelson Interview, supra note 68.
188. Ms. Crane's firm was cancelled by its insurer after doing business with them for over
20 years. She attributes this action in part to the firm's bad loss experience in the past, but
comments that even firms with increased safety in their operations have been unable to
obtain insurance. She predicts that her firm will not be able to obtain insurance, even though
it is willing to pay for it; and therefore, it will probably self-insure. Such an option may not
be open to a smaller firm, consequently, it may be forced out of business. Crane Interview,
supra note 187.
189. Id.; Nelson Interview, supra note 68; Benett interview, supra note 85.
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to self-insure or apply to the state's assigned risk pool.9 0 For a small
firm it may be impossible to self-insure, since such action requires
a filing of a bond and a showing of an economic capability to cover
anticipated losses."'
Consequently, the number of Illinois businesses and industries
applying to the state's assigned risk insurance pool increased from
600 applications per year to the current rate of almost 500 per
month.'92 This pool is a refuge for those businesses which have been
refused coverage by at least three insurance carriers. After determining that the business is nonetheless entitled to coverage, the
Industrial Commission must assign an insurance carrier to underwrite the policy. The carrier than has no option, and theoretically,
the insurance must be available at the standard rates. However, a
twenty-five percent surcharge is allowed because of the company's
prior loss experience. In fact, the carriers routinely assess the surcharge to all assigned risks-even new businesses that have no prior
loss experience.'93
The average percentage of payroll now paid by Illinois companies
for workmen's compensation insurance is 3.23 (per $100 payroll). 9"
This is somewhat higher than most other states,'95 yet arguably this
still represents a small amount of the actual payroll and would not
justify an employer moving to another state to avoid these costs.' 6
190. Workmen's Compensation or Occupational Disease Insurance for Rejected Employers, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73 § 1083 (1975) provides:
Insurance for employers rejected by three carriers (a) when it is found by the
Commission that the application of an employer for compensation or occupational
disease insurance has been rejected in writing by three (3) carriers and that such
employer is entitled to insurance, the Commission shall designate a carrier which
shall be obligated to issue forthwith a standard policy ...
191. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4 (1975) provides:
Any employer who shall come within the provisions of Section 3 . . . shall:
(1) File with the Commission an application for approval as a self-insurer which
shall include a current financial statement . . . . If the sworn application and
financial statement of any such employer does not satisfy the Commission of the
financial ability of the employer who has filed it, the Commission shall require such
employer to, (2) Furnish security, indemnity or a bond guaranteeing the payment
by the employer of the compensation.
192. Benett Interview, supra note 85.
193. This surcharge is authorized by the rules promulgated by the Illinois Industrial
Commission, The Department of Insurance is now undertaking to monitor special complaints
in this area. Benett Interview, supra note 85.
194. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,
INSURANCE (1976).

COMPARISON OF WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

195. Id.
196. See THE REPORT, supra note 1, at 75. The study points out that even
increase in workmen's compensation, the amount is small in relation to other
by the employer. The National Commission estimates that the total of all
excluding overtime, is 22.2 percent of the wages paid. Illinois' current average

with the cost
benefits paid
supplements
percentage of
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The Illinois Industrial Commission has made a survey of the
Commission's experience as of April 29, 1976 with the cost of benefits under the Acts as amended in July 1, 1975 as compared with
the costs of benefits under the acts prior to July 1, 1975."1 Its statistics reveal that the average amount received per claim has not increased significantly.'98 Indeed, the increase was so minimal that it
would be wholly justified by the increase in the cost of living that
occurred during the period. Admittedly, the survey evaluated only
early to compute any accurate
a small time period and it may be too
0 99
assessment of actual cost increases.
The Commission also solicited an opinion from a self-insurance
service, a service which handles the administrative procedures of
firms which do self-insure. The Commission wanted to know what
the service's projections were as to the increased costs attributable
to the amendments. The self-insurance service anticipates a twenty
to twenty-five percent cost increase.2 0 These figures raise questions
as to the validity of the insurance carriers's ninety percent increases.
The insurance carriers' problem is that they cannot adequately
predict the costs of these amendments. The ambiguities present in
parts of the acts compound this problem. 2 1 Perhaps the insurance
companies'
response is an over-reaction to their fear of the unknown
2

liability.

02

Many of the 1975 amendments which had threatened the most
drastic cost increases to the employers were deleted or modified by
the 1976 amendments. For example, the provision requiring fifty
percent of the employee's average weekly wage as the minimum
benefit was deleted. 23 Further, the definition of an occupational
disease was limited to require that the disease must "arise out of a
risk peculiar to or increased by the employment and not common
3.23 percent does not seem unreasonable in comparison with the amounts paid overall for
supplements.
197. ILLINOIS INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, REPORT (April 29, 1976).
198. Id. The average claim for a three month period in 1975 was $3,565 in comparison to
$3,647 which represented the average for the identical period in 1976.
199. Benett Interview, supra note 85.
200. Id.
201. Crane Interview, supra note 187. Ms. Crane pointed out that for claims arising under
the Occupational Disease Act, where an employer may be liable for a disease which results
from exposure to chemicals over a period of twenty years, it is now impossible to compute
the liability. Additionally, the ambiquities surrounding the definition of an occupational
disease, i.e. a disease which has become aggravated and rendered disabling as a result of the
employment, makes liability especially difficult to predict. It is necessary to have a definitive
judicial interpretation of what is sufficiently aggravating and disabling to put a boundary on
this definition.
202. Id.
203. Pub. Act No. 79-1450 (Oct. 1, 1976); see notes 108-10 supra.
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to the general public."2 °4 Despite these 1976 changes, insurance carriers anticipate only a one percent decrease in the cost estimate
attributable to the legislation." 5 The estimate was not accepted by
the Department of Insurance and is currently being scrutinized
along with the three previous rate increases at the Department's
public hearings.
A

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Although critics claim that the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act is driving employers out of Illinois, it is doubtful whether the
statutory differences are substantial enough to justify an employer
moving an entire business to avoid these costs. An analysis of state
workmen's compensation laws as of January 1, 1976 demonstrated
that many states do have benefits comparable to those offered in
Illinois. Forty-seven states, including Illinois, have established twothirds of the employee's average weekly wage as the benefit rate for
temporary total and permanent total disabilities. 0 Illinois had the
third highest maximum weekly benefit allowable, $205.207 This figure represents Illinois' state average weekly wage in the manufacturing industry. The high maximum in Illinois is related to the fact
that Illinois is one of the largest industrial states in the United
States, and consequently, has a higher average wage than most
other states. Eighteen other states provide a maximum benefit for
temporary total disabilities of 100 percent of the state's average
weekly wage 08 and sixteen provide this rate for permanent total
disabilities.2 ' 9
Illinois has no time or amount limitations on the payment of these
disabilities. Thirty-four states have identical provisions.2', Thirtyeight states, including Illinois, provide for death benefits to be computed on the same basis as other disabilities (two-thirds of employee's wage)."' Illinois provides that these death benefits will be
paid to the spouse for life or until remarriage. Currently, twenty
eight states have a similar provision.2 12 Upon remarriage, the two
204.
205.
206.

Pub. Act No. 79-1450 (Oct. 1, 1976).
Seligman Interview, supra note 175; Nelson Interview, supra note 68.
INTERDEPARTMENTAL TASK FORCE ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-

SATION UNDER STATE LAWS

LAwsl.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

(1976) [hereinafter cited as WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION UNDER STATE

The current figure is $230.47. Benett Interview, supra note 85.
supra note 206.
Id.
Id.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION UNDER STATE LAWS,

Id.
Id.

Workmen's Compensation in Illinois

19771

year lump sum payment to the spouse is paid in Illinois as in nineteen other states. 13 Only five other states provide for the death
benefits to continue to eligible children until age twenty-five if they
21
are students.
In the light of these statistics, it would seem that Illinois Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease Acts are not out of
line with the protection offered by many other states. Additionally,
the bulk of the Illinois changes are in compliance with the National
Commission's standards. For example, compensation rates for temporary total and permanent total disabilities, death benefits, and
statute of limitations provisions all meet the Commission's standards without transcending them.21 5 It is probable that the rest of
the states may soon follow Illinois' lead to provide a more comprehensive, equitable compensation plan for employees in compliance
with the Commission's recommendations.
CONCLUSION

In 1976 the legislature deleted the "never less than 50 percent of
an employee's average income" benefit provision and narrowed the
definition of an occupational disease to clarify that the disease
should have a substantial relationship to the employment.21 , Thus
the most offending aspects (or at least most loudly criticized) of the
1975 amendments have been modified or deleted. Much of the adverse reaction to the 1975 amendments was premised on uncertainties. Additionally, this reaction was aggravated by the fact, that the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act had not kept pace with the
rising wages over the years.2 17 Therefore, at the time of the federal
investigation in 1972, the Act needed substantial revision in order
to provide adequate benefits to employees. The increased benefits
were not achieved gradually, but in one comprehensive bill in 1975.
Finally, the initial reaction by insurance carriers may subside after
a more realistic assessment of cost can be made based on actual
experience.
It is unlikely that the legislature will retract the benefit provisions. Instead, lobbying efforts in the future may focus on the actual
delivery system of the benefits. Finally, the most important variable
in the compensation program's future is whether the complexion of
the Illinois General Assembly will remain labor oriented.
MARGARET
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

E. MCCLOSKEY

Id.

Id. Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, Puerto Rico and Texas.
See text accompanying notes 92, 101 and 113 supra.
Pub. Act No. 79-1450 (Oct. 1, 1976).
Workmen's Compensation: The Need for Reform, supra note 9, at 564.

